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21 October 1970


MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT: ER IM 70-134, Communist Subversion
in the South Vietnamese Army and
Security Apparatus

1. As you requested this morning I have sent a copy of the subject report and its dissemination list to

2. IM 70-134 which was published and disseminated in September of this year is a natural fallout from IM 70-63, the May report which was the basis of Neil Sheehan's article. The May report was a brief and general description of the Viet Cong subversive organizations particularly the three military agencies. The September report is a detailed and expanded discussion of just one of these three military agencies -- the military proselyting section. The two reports are consistent with each other in terms of their assessment of the Viet Cong subversive threat and particularly in terms of the quantitative estimates of the magnitude of this threat. The September report caveats its estimates in the same fashion as did the May report. In addition the September report contains a methodological note explaining how the numbers were developed.

3. The September report differs from the May analysis in a few respects. To begin with the September analysis is a much more balanced treatment partly because it is a much longer and detailed report. For example, the September report gives much greater acknowledgement of progress achieved by the GVN security apparatus in coping with the Viet Cong threat. Even so, it retains the same relatively pessimistic outlook for the future which was presented in the May analysis. In some respects, the September report is even stronger



SECRET

in tone when assessing the inadequacies of the GVN security organization (see particularly paragraph 85b on page 28).

4. As I have told you previously, the coordination of this report, both within DDI and with DDP, was extremely difficult. Final coordination of the report was obtained partly because of the need to satisfy Mr. Kissinger's request for the analysis and because all parties realized that it would be nigh impossible to obtain a text which would be completely satisfactory to all. OCI, for example, felt that the report might have paid more attention to factors other than the GVN security organization which help to determine whether the GVN can cope with the enemy threat. DDP always had some reservations about the numbers, and coordinated rather reluctantly. My personal opinion is that this reluctance is explained by a general uneasiness on their part about the subject of GVN security being analyzed at all, and some apprehension about this type of analysis receiving wide dissemination in the intelligence community.

[Redacted Signature Box]

Deputy Director
Economic Research

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - Addressee
2 - OD/OER
✓ 1 - DD/OER

DD/OER: [Redacted Box] (21 Oct 70)

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External Dissemination of ER IM 70-134, "Communist Subversion in the South Vietnamese Army and Security Apparatus"

25X11

IM 70-134 was disseminated to non-Agency recipients in 72 copies, via standard dissemination, OER Elite Dissemination, or in response to specific requests.

Standard Dissemination

<u>Agency</u>	<u>Copies</u>
ACSI/Army	16
Department of the Navy	1
ACSI/Air Force	16
Department of State	5
Director, NSA	7
National Security Council	1
National Indications Center	1
Defense Intelligence Agency	<u>14</u>
	61

OER Elite Dissemination

National Security Council Staff	2
Department of State	3
Defense Intelligence Agency	2
DOD/ISA	1
DOD/JCS	1
Frank Hand, OSD	<u>1</u>
	10

Specific Request

OSD/Systems Analysis	1
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